Population scenarios and policy implications for South Mediterranean countries, 2010-2050 by Groenewold, W.G.F. & Beer de, J.A.A.
This policy brief was derived from the main WP3 technical report produced in the context of the 
MEDPRO (Mediterranean Prospects) project, a three-year project funded under the Socio-economic 
Sciences & Humanities Programme of DG Research of the European Commission’s Seventh 
Framework Research Programme. Aim of the policy brief is to summarize and convey main findings of 
WP3 technical reports to a wider audience, including persons in EU and SMC policy domains.  
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed are attributable only to the authors in a personal 
capacity and not to any institution with which they are associated.  
Available for free downloading from the MEDPRO (www.medpro-foresight.eu) 
and CEPS (www.ceps.eu) websites 
© Copyright 2013, George Groenewold and Joop de Beer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population Scenarios and Policy Implications for  
South Mediterranean Countries, 2010-2050  
 
 
Abstract 
 
Four population scenarios were derived describing changes in indicators of demographic behaviour should 
people come to live in different future political-economic contexts. Focus of this policy brief is on expected 
trends in (1) population growth at regional and national levels, (2) working age populations in view of 
demographic dividend potential for the economy, and (3) population of elderly persons in view of the future 
financial burden this group might impose on societies. Results show that different economic-political 
development scenarios do have large effects on population growth, at least up to 2030). This is due to the so-
called population momentum effect in the relatively young age-structures of most SMCs. In the short term, up to 
2030, and depending on which economic-political unfolds, SMCs expected to grow from 280 million people to a 
figure between 362 and 349 million people. Thus, in a period of about 20 years SMC populations are expected to 
grow with a figure between 69 and 83 million. In that same period, EU27 populations will grow with 21 million 
only from about 500 to 521 million people. Between 2030 and 2050, additional population growth is foreseen in 
SMCs, between 48 and 62 million people, while EU27 populations are expected to grow with only 4 million 
during that period. SMCs appear to vary widely regarding demographic transition profiles so that demographic 
dividend potentials also vary. For instance, Egypt has considerably demographic dividend potential ahead in the 
coming decades as working age population shares will rise from 63% (2010) to a peak level of about 68% by 
2045. In Turkey though, the working age population share is already high (68%) and near the expected peak 
level of 69%  (by 2025) after which a decline sets in. The window of opportunity -the period when working age 
population shares rise to peak levels and remain at a high level- is starting to close for Lebanon and Tunisia 
though levels will remain high up to 2035 after which a decline sets in due to ageing of these populations. 
Ageing implies an increase of the economic burden to economies as elderly generally do not contribute any 
longer to economies as they did during their working age years. Old-age dependency ratios, the share of elderly 
in relation to the working age population, are still low compared to EU27 ratios but will increase  after 2035. 
Should SMCs remain politically, economically and environmentally fragile in the coming decades, these lower 
dependency ratios will impose a relatively higher social and financial burden to societies than the high 
dependency ratios  in EU countries.  
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Introduction 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004, with the goal of strengthening the 
prosperity, stability and security of all and avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between EU 
countries and its neighbours. The idea of the ENP was revamped in 2008 with the launch of the Union 
for the Mediterranean (UfM); a multilateral partnership between the 27 EU countries and 16 
Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans. The UfM (also 
known as the Barcelona Process) was launched when plans to create an autonomous Mediterranean 
Union, akin to the EU, were dropped (EC, 2012). 
Demographic factors and pressures in both EU and ENP countries impinge on the realisation of the 
ENP and UfM goals. The latter include Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Moldova, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and 
Ukraine. ENP excludes Turkey because, contrary to ENP countries, it gained EU accession 
perspective in 1999 at the Helsinki European Council meeting (EC, 2012).  
Population structures, pressures and future prospects in the two regions are quite different as the 
characteristics of demographic transition, such as timing and speed of decline of fertility and mortality 
rates, are quite different. Compared to EU countries, most ENP countries started experiencing 
declining fertility and mortality much later, during the 1990s, notably the south  Mediterranean ENP 
countries (WHO, 2011; UN, 2011a; UN, 2012). As a result, ageing population structures currently 
characterise EU countries, while young age structures characterise many ENP countries.  
Systematic and comparative research has been carried out on future population and development 
prospects for EU countries (e.g. Rees, et al., 2012; Hilderink, 2004: Lutz and Scherbov, 2004), but it is 
absent for ENP countries. This paper aims to contribute to widening this kind of insight to EU 
neighbour countries by presenting and analysing population and development scenarios for ENP 
countries for the period 2010-2050.  We start out by describing how the population and development 
scenarios were constructed and what each scenario actually entails. Then, we discuss the scenario 
results by focussing on (1) the implications for future population growth prospects at the level of the 
region and countries, (2) the implications for future shares of the working age population (15-64) and 
the elderly (65+) in the population. We conclude with a discussion about the plausibility of the 
scenario results in light of the political upheaval and transformations since 2010 (i.e. The Arab Spring).  
Future prospects of these two age groups are of particular interest to the economy. The working age 
population determines the size of the potential labour force contributing to economic production and 
growth. An increase in the share of this group in the total population is potentially beneficial because 
if the size of this group increases then production and economic growth may benefit from increased 
availability of workers. A rise of the share of the working age population is considered a ‘demographic 
dividend’ to the economy, provided certain conditions are met. The share of the elderly is also of 
economic interest because, generally speaking, they may contribute to the economy indirectly through 
investments derived from their life-time accumulated wealth and savings, and, they are consumers of 
paid or subsidized old-age care (Mason and Lee, 2007; Lee and Mason, 2006; Mason 2005).  
Our focus is on a subset of ENP countries, the ten geographically and culturally adjacent ENP 
countries Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine (O.P.T.), Syria, Tunisia, 
and on Turkey. Turkey was included because it is a key player in the political arenas of the 
Mediterranean region and the Middle East, in cultural and economic sense its intertwined with 
neighbouring ENP countries, and it comprises of one of the largest populations in the region. Below, 
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Population scenarios 
A first step in the design of population scenarios was to identify the pillars of a framework for 
development scenarios which are later used to derive population scenarios. The MEDPRO project 
choose the following pillars to build a framework for development scenarios: (1) development of total 
wealth in SMCs, (2) development of political-economic cooperation between SMCs and EU countries, 
and (3) development trajectories are assumed to be either a success or a failure (Sessa, 2011; Ayadi 
and Sessa, 2011). The table below brings these pillars together shaping the contours of a broad 
framework for  development scenarios. Different combinations lead to eight different development 
scenarios, which essentially should be interpreted as eight different visions about how the economic-
political context of SMC countries might look like. However, working with eight different 
conceptualizations about the future is confusing and cumbersome to work with, assumptions were 
introduced to reduce the number of eligible scenarios from eight to four (i.e. S1 to S4 in Annex 1):    
a.  Future increases in total wealth cannot co-exist or be achieved without interregional or regional 
cooperation.  
b.  Future options of international cooperation are limited to two types: 1) cooperation with EU 
countries and the integration of SMCs into an expanding EU market, 2) the launch of an 
independent Pan-Arab political and economic system akin to the EU.  
c.  SMCs either cooperate within a framework with EU countries, or in one with all other Arab 
League nations, not in both.  
Table 1. Broad  framework for population and development scenarios  
 
The framework in Table 1 was then transformed into a two-dimensional framework (Figure 1) 
whereby each development scenario comprises a particular combination of characteristics in terms of  
developments in regional political cooperation and envisioned total wealth prospects. Development 
scenarios sketch broad and different kinds of future worlds in which demographic behaviour in terms 
of migration, fertility and mortality is likely differ, leading to different population growth trajectories.   
For practical reasons, the four scenarios were labelled providing a kind of ‘identity’ to each scenario. 
Contrary to the Business-As-Usual and stress scenarios, the integration and alliance scenarios are both, 
economically and politically speaking, favourable outlooks to the future.  
Figure 1.  Derived  framework for population and development scenarios (Adapted from Sessa, 2011) 
 
Increase Decrease
Success S2
Failure S1
Success S3
Failure S4
Total wealth
EU‐SMC cooperation
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Below storylines are presented describing the qualitative economic, political, and demographic 
characteristics and assumptions of four population and development scenarios, and we conclude with 
an overview table (Annex 1) showing the results of operationalizing these story-lines and assumptions. 
These were used to derive the population scenarios results proper  for the period 2010-2050.  
Business-as-usual (BAU) scenario (S1) sketches an unfavourable political and economic future 
that could be interpreted as an extrapolation of past trends. It assumes that the political upheavals and 
changes in various SMCs (e.g. Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Syria) since 2010 as well as the EU financial 
crisis will settle at a development trajectory between 2015 and 2020 that could be interpreted as a 
repositioning on a trend line that would have emerged in the absence of these upheavals and changes. 
This means continuation of decrease in total wealth in populations resulting from a partial and ad hoc 
kind of SMC-EU cooperation that fails to develop firm action and collaboration regarding key political, 
security, economic, socio-cultural and environmental issues. The BAU scenario (S1) assumes that the 
EU also pays a price for not expanding EU-membership beyond the current 27 countries, i.e. in terms 
of foregoing certain economic and political benefits. Overall, the BAU scenario (S1) assumes that 
during the 2010-2050 period the economic influence of the EU in the Middle East continues to decline. 
On the political front, the scenario assumes that the Israel-Palestine conflict will not be resolved 
constraining economic growth and political stability in the region. From a long term perspective, this 
scenario assumes no breakthrough political, social, technological, and cultural changes (Ayadi & 
Sessa, 2012).  
Also in terms of demographic behaviour no major changes are assumed to take place. Regarding 
international migration stocks and flows, the BAU scenario assumes that annual net numbers of 
migrants (i.e. number of immigrants minus emigrants) of countries for the period 2005-2010 remains 
more or less stable during the whole of the period 2010-2050, with the exception of the period 2010-
2015. The latter accounts for unexpected international migration flows resulting from the political 
upheaval during the 2010-2012 period (Arab Spring). For those years we expect that numbers 
emigrating in a number of countries will be higher than anticipated. The net numbers of migrants that 
we  used in our population scenario projections are based on figures compiled by the UN Population 
Division (UN, 2011a). Regarding future fertility levels, the BAU scenario assumes that the observed 
past changes in fertility rates in most SMCs will continue, but the speed of the change will differ by 
country, depending on past rates of change. Thus, fertility rates for some countries will decline even 
further, while rates of other countries may increase. The decline will be less rapid than, for instance,  
in the integration scenario (S2), because it will take more time before institutions (men, kinship group, 
community) will have lowered family size preferences and individual women gain more freedom to 
decide about the number of children to have. However, it is expected that, by 2050, at the level of the 
SMC region, the average of country-specific fertility rates will have settled at replacement level. This 
means that, on average, women in SMCs are expected to give birth to 2.1 children during their 
reproductive life so that, after accounting for mortality risks, each mother will just be replaced by a 
daughter who also will become a mother and survive at least up to the end of her reproductive life at 
about age 50. This scenario assumes that observed  past improvements in life expectancy at birth for 
each individual country will continue but at a pace that is dependent on the level currently attained and 
the pace with which life expectancy improved since 1990. The BAU scenario assumes that differences 
between countries regarding fertility, mortality and migration rates remain intact.  
Integration scenario (S2) describes a very favourable political and economic future. EU-SMC 
cooperation is assumed to improve significantly so that by 2050 the EU-27 market has expanded to 
include the 11 SMCs, becoming EU-38. This market is highly integrated at political, economic, social 
and military levels, where total wealth increased markedly, and where incidence and prevalence of 
poverty in SMCs is comparable to the average EU level.  Because of institutional and governance 
adaptations in SMC economies it takes up to 2030 before these countries match economic growth rates 
of EU countries. In this vision of the future, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is resolved by 2020 
providing an extra impetus to economic growth and cultural tolerance. By 2050, the EU-38 has 
become one of the three key economic and political powers in the world, alongside the USA and 
China (Ayadi & Sessa, 2011).  6 | GROENEWOLD & DE BEER  
 
Such a development context is likely to be associated with different type of demographic behaviour 
than in other scenarios. In the first phase of economic growth (2010-2030) it is expected that 
emigration from SMCs to the EU will increase because labour demand in EU countries is increasing 
due to rapidly ageing working age populations, notably in southern EU member states. Furthermore, 
many of the SMC emigrants who work as contract labourers in the oil-producing Middle Eastern 
countries are expected to also migrate to EU countries because access to and stay in EU countries have 
become much easier and living conditions better. As a result, negative net numbers of migrants are 
expected to increase during the period 2010-2030 as emigrants from SMCs to the EU will outnumber 
immigrants and return migrants. In the second phase of economic growth (2030-2050), economies and 
welfare in SMCs have reached full development. Potential emigrants find it now easier to secure 
attractive income-earning opportunities in their own country while return migration will become more 
important, including children of first- generation emigrants who were born in EU countries of 
destination. As costs of international travel relative to total income decrease in this scenario, 
temporary short-term and circular types of migration will be on the increase too. The overall net result 
is that during the 2030-2050 period, all SMCs currently having negative net migration numbers (i.e. 
emigration being higher than immigration) will experience their negative net migration numbers 
turning into positive ones.  
In an EU-38 setting it is expected that intercultural contact with EU citizens increases and that EU 
rules and regulations regarding equality and equal opportunities of men and women are adopted in 
SMCs. Overall, the status and decision-making power of women is expected to increase considerably 
in this scenario which is assumed to fertility rates declining more rapidly than in the BAU scenario 
(S1), leading to rates resembling the currently observed low levels in EU-27 countries, which currently 
is 1.5 children. It is expected that, as time goes by, similar economic, social, cultural and psychosocial 
factors underlying the European fertility decline will affect fertility levels in SMCs. For instance, 
larger numbers of women in the SMC will successfully participate in the education system, leading to 
higher levels of educational attainment leading to gains decision-making power regarding personal 
aspirations (e.g. number of children, timing and spacing of births, labour force participation and 
employment careers), household and community matters (participation in councils, local governments). 
Furthermore, it is expected that ‘individualism’ b e c o m e s  m o r e  w i d e s p r e a d  i n  S M C s  s o  t h a t  a n  
increasing number of women have the number of children they want. Also, women in SMCs will be 
increasingly called upon to participate in the labour market to cope with local  labour shortages 
resulting from economic development and growth. It is therefore expected that women in SMCs, 
notably those with the right diplomas, will have opportunities to work in Europe and will increasingly 
make use of that opportunity. Overall, the educational attainment increases of women are expected to 
lead to an irreversible increase of female labour force participation (i.e. paid work outside the home 
and overseas) which competes with childbearing and rearing, eventually resulting in lower fertility 
aspirations and low fertility rates. Another fertility reducing effect in this high economic growth 
scenario comes from expected improvements in health infrastructure in SMCs. Such improvements are 
expected to lead to a further reduction in levels of unmet need for family planning services.  
This economic growth scenario will also have a net positive effect on the health and mortality 
conditions of people in SMCs as the availability, access and affordability of health services shall 
eventually be at par with the average EU level. Pre- and post natal care, immunization of children, 
child care practices of mothers (partly due to increases in educational attainment levels) will 
significantly improve, leading to much lower infant and child mortality rates and higher life 
expectancies. However, this scenario also perceives a negative development as unhealthy western-
style food habits and lifestyles will be increasingly adopted in the region, leading to further increases 
in obesity (among adults as well as children) and related welfare diseases and higher risks of mortality 
at intermediate and higher ages. The expected net effect is that the pace with which life expectancy  
the SMCs  increases in this scenario will be higher than in the BAU- (S1) and stress (S4) scenarios, 
but lower than in the alliance scenario (S3).  POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS FOR SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 2010-2050 | 7 
 
As compared to the BAU and stress scenarios (S1 and S4), the integration scenario (S2) is a kind of 
‘convergence scenario’ in that it assumes that differences between countries regarding fertility, 
mortality and migration rates will eventually have disappeared by 2050.  
Alliance scenario (S3) also sketches a favourable economic and political future context. SMCs will 
increase their collaboration and expand to include other countries in the Middle East (e.g. Iraq, Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, and Sudan) and form one large Pan-Arab common market, akin to the EU. Turkey 
though is assumed to join the EU. Due to their geographic proximity a strategic alliance is formed 
between the EU and Pan-Arabic markets to ensure that the two adjacent and independent markets are 
connected in an efficient and effective manner, contributing to economic prosperity and political 
stability in both regions. Thus, economic and political interaction and development is first and 
foremost taking place between countries within the two regional markets. According to this scenario, 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also assumed to be resolved removing a major barrier to internal 
(south-south) market cooperation. Eventually, the Mediterranean region emerges as a peaceful and 
inspiring meeting and business place of people living in two adjacent regional markets. The EU and 
Pan-Arab markets collaborate, in particular on some key issues such as security and quality of 
environmental resources. However, development of an independent and effective Pan-Arab economy 
and political system takes time so that economic benefits in terms of total wealth increases are 
expected at a later stage in the period 2010-2050 than according to the integration scenario (S2). This 
scenario envisages a multi-polar global market with several economic regions competing and with no 
particular region dominating (Ayadi & Sessa, 2011).  
As economies grow and the movement of people and goods within the two newly established market 
areas becomes easier, it is expected that net negative migration of many SMCs increase as working in 
the Gulf States becomes easier. These volumes are expected to level off during the period 2015-2030 
as growing SMC economies increasingly provide job-opportunities to their own citizens. Similar to the 
integration scenario (S2), the economic growth process in SMC takes time to gain momentum and 
success so that this scenario foresees that negative net migration numbers, as a result of declining 
numbers of emigrants and increasing numbers of immigrants, will gradually turn into positive net 
numbers of migration by 2030 and later. By 2050 this process will result in a situation whereby 
numbers emigrating and immigrating will balance so that the net numbers of migrants is zero. Thus, 
the orientation of migrants in this scenario is primarily towards labour markets in the Arab region and 
not towards EU or elsewhere as in the integration scenario (S2). In this scenario it is also expected that 
most long-term refugees will have managed to establish a new life in their host country and have 
integrated into these societies.  
There are two main forces at play determining future trends in fertility according to this scenario. On 
the one hand economic growth is expected to lead to major improvements in availability and access to 
health services. This will have a fertility reducing effect as, similar to the situation in the integration 
scenario (S2), levels of unmet need for family planning; around 10% in many SMCs (UN, 2012), are 
expected to reduce to 0%. On the other hand, western-style individualism will have much less of an 
effect on the lives of people in SMCs than in the integration scenario (S2). Traditional family norms 
and values will remain intact and the influence of the larger social group and concomitant control 
mechanisms will lead to family size preferences that are, on average, somewhat higher than in the 
integration scenario (S2). However, such traditions are under pressure as the labour market in this 
scenario will increasingly expect women to participate and this will stimulate governments to 
encourage parents to invest in the education of their daughters, eventually leading to higher levels of 
educational attainment and occupational skills among women (and men).  As a result current very low 
labour force participation rates of women are expected to increase significantly. The net effect of both 
forces is believed to be that fertility levels will decline, but the speed of decline will be slower than 
according to the integration scenario (S2) so that, by 2050, fertility levels will have settled to a higher 
level than in the integration scenario (S2).  
Health status and life expectancy improvements are expected to be better in than the integration 
scenario (S2) implying a higher annual rate of change in life expectancy than in the integration 
scenario (S2). Main reason for this assumption is that western-type lifestyles and health behaviour will 8 | GROENEWOLD & DE BEER  
 
have less of a chance of being adopted due to the presence of a strong tradition of social control over 
how individuals behave. Thus, individualism will have far less chance of developing so that adverse 
western-style lifestyles, such as food and lifestyle habits detrimental to health, will occur less than in 
the integration scenario (S2). Overall, and in contrast to the situation in the integration scenario (S2), 
individuals will remain more embedded in their social group and receive more protection in situations 
of stress, ill-health and need.  
Similar to the integration scenario (S2), and contrary to the BAU and stress scenarios  (S1 and S4) 
country-specific values of indicators of fertility and mortality in this alliance scenario (S3) are 
assumed to converge to some average regional level value.  
Stress scenario (S4) is a worst-case scenario regarding economic and political development in the 
Arab world. The Mediterranean Sea is perceived as the dividing line between two opposing and 
competing cultures, i.e. the European vis-à-vis the Arab cultures. Within the Arab region, the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict lingers on, hampering economic development and political cooperation within the 
region. Although inhabitants of SMCs pay the highest price in terms of decreasing prosperity, security 
and well-being, people in adjacent EU countries will also be affected by negative economic and 
political spill-over effects in the medium and long run. Factories, firms and small shops in SMCs find 
it increasingly difficult to make a profit and pay their staff. The mismatch between government 
expenditures and income becomes greater so that, eventually, governments have to lay off staff. As 
government institutions employ a relatively large share of the labour force, unemployment rates 
increase dramatically, notably among young adults, leading to political unrest and foreign investors 
becoming more hesitant to invest in SMCs. Eventually, political stability in the region is at stake and 
new conflicts arise that cannot adequately be dealt with by the governments and elite groups. This 
scenario essentially describes a future with increased poverty, political instability and insecurity, 
natural resource depletion and pollution, and social and ethnic thrive (Ayadi & Sessa, 2011). 
In such a future context, households find it increasingly difficult to cope with poverty. In spite of the 
restricted access to EU countries and Gulf States, many unemployed citizens, mainly men, choose to 
leave the country in search of income overseas to support to their families and relatives back home. 
Many emigrants will therefore enter the EU and Gulf State countries as illegal immigrants where they 
become exploited and have to live as outcasts. As this will not go unnoticed by the media in the EU, 
the general attitude towards immigrants in the EU will become even more negative than it is today. In 
spite of the limited prospects many emigrants have abroad, poverty at home means that many people 
are forced to migrate to other countries. During the period 2010-2050 the stress scenario (S4) foresees 
that annual net migration numbers will hover at very high negative numbers as emigrants and by far 
outnumber immigrants and return migrants. Only a sub-group of well-educated SMC citizens find 
ways to overcome restrictive entry measures (e.g. for the EU, Gulf States, the US, and Far East) and, 
through internet contact, find attractive jobs abroad (the brain drain). These persons find employment 
because the ageing EU labour market provides openings to well-educated and skilled immigrants from 
outside the EU. In the stress scenario (S4) the situation in SMCs has become such that emigrants do 
not want to return and do their utmost to reunite with their family by letting them immigrate too in 
destination countries. The (negative) net number of international migrants rises to historical highs in 
SMCs during the period 2010-2050. 
The deterioration of SMC economies results in more impoverished health services, including the 
availability and access to family planning services. Having many children becomes a great burden in 
terms of cost, leading to fewer births in some families than desired. However, in other families fertility 
levels increase because access to family planning services decreases as costs (user fees) increase. In 
terms of underlying factors, negative economic growth is, generally speaking, detrimental to female 
labour force participation and wages, resulting in more women staying at home, losing decision-
making power and independence, leading to a higher number of children than anticipated. In a similar 
way, parents tend to invest less in educating their daughters if poverty strikes in the household, leading 
to higher fertility rates. Overall, the stress scenario (S4) foresees that the long-term net effect of poor 
macro-economic and political performance is that fertility decline in some SMCs will halt or even 
increase during the 2010-2050 period and that, at the aggregate level of the SMC region, the fertility POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS FOR SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 2010-2050 | 9 
 
level settles at levels above replacement level fertility. Of all scenarios, the decline in country-specific 
fertility levels is least and eventually settles at higher levels in 2050 than according to the other 
scenarios.  
The detrimental macro economic and political trend implies that health infrastructure increasingly 
becomes disrupted. Furthermore, large-scale emigration means that in certain places social group 
support systems break down and communities disintegrate, leading to increased poverty levels in 
urban and rural areas. Deteriorating living conditions may result in higher infection rates and disease 
prevalence among vulnerable groups, such as pregnant women and children. At the macro level this 
development may translate into higher maternal mortality rates and higher childhood mortality rates, 
leading to life expectancies that increase less or even decrease. However, in times of stress, people 
flock together and provide support to each other. In SMCs this situation is expected to provide an 
impetus and revival of existing social support systems among members of the same descent group, 
clans, neighbourhoods, etc., which will have a positive effect on mortality rates in vulnerable groups. 
The stress scenario (S4) foresees that the net effect of these expectations is that life expectancies, at 
the level of the nation, will still increase, but at a much slower pace than in the other three scenarios.  
The above story lines and assumptions were operationalized, and these are summarized in Annex 1.   
Data 
Base-line age-sex data of SMCs and data required for the formulation of assumptions about future 
rates of fertility, mortality and migration (Annex 1) were obtained from databases of National 
Statistical Offices of SMCs, UN Population Division (UN, 2011a), World Health Organisation (Health 
statistics and health information systems) (WHO, 2011), and from the UN Global Migration Database 
(version 0.3.6) (UN, 2011b). For an explanation of the projection methodology, see Groenewold et al. 
(2012). 
Regional and national population scenarios  
Table 3 and Figure 2 show that populations in SMCs are expected to grow from 280 million in 2010 to 
a figure between about 395 (S4) and 426 (S3) in 2050. In the short term (2010-2030) SMC populations 
are expected to grow with a figure between 69 (S4) and 83 (S3) million. Conversely, during that 
period EU27 populations are expected to grow with about 21 million (Eurostat, 2012). In the long term 
(2030-2050) though another 48 to 62 million persons will be added to  SMC populations while only 4 
million will be added to EU27 populations. In the coming 10 years the population in the SMC region 
is expected to grow with a number between 39 million and 43 million, depending on the scenario.  
Table 5 shows that SMCs differ markedly in population size and population growth rates and that  
regional population growth is predominantly determined by growth in the largest two countries, Egypt 
and Turkey. There, in 2010, about 81 and 73 million people lived, respectively, comprising 55% of the 
population in the region. At the level of the region, the effect of the assumptions of the alliance 
scenario (S3) lead to the highest population growth, while at the level of the country, different 
scenarios lead to highest population growth. For instance, in the case of Lebanon it is the integration 
scenario (S2) leading to highest population growth while for Libya and the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory it is the BAU scenario (S1).  
Expected population growth in Egypt is the highest in the region. Depending on the scenario, Egypt’s 
population will increase between 2010 and 2050 with a figure between 44 and 53 million persons. 
Stress scenario (S4) has the most severe effects on population growth in Lebanon. Lebanon currently 
already has a low and below replacement fertility level (TFR about 1.8 in 2005). Although fertility in 
Lebanon is expected to increase to replacement level fertility during the period 2010-2050, the effect 
of large-scale emigration in the stress scenario (S4) will more than cancel out the increase in births 
leading to an expected decline in the population from 4.2 million in 2010 to about 2.8 million during 
the 2045-2050 period. Israel is the only other country for which population size will also decline in the 
stress scenario (S4), as a result of the assumed high level of out-migration and very low level of 
immigration.    10 | GROENEWOLD & DE BEER  
 
 
 
Table 3. Population  estimates by  development scenario (S1-S4), and UN estimates (millions) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Regional population growth by development scenario (S1-S4),  UN estimate, and EU-27 
population growth  
 
 
2010
S1 S2 S3 S4 UN S1 S2 S3 S4 UN S1 S2 S3 S4 UN
Algeria 35,5 41,0 40,6 41,0 40,6 40,6 45,3 44,3 45,4 43,8 44,0 51,6 50,3 52,3 48,1 48,2
Egypt 81,1 95,9 94,9 95,8 95,2 95,7 109,3 106,6 109,3 107,3 108,0 133,5 125,7 132,2 130,7 126,9
Israel 7,4 8,5 8,6 8,5 8,0 8,9 9,6 10,3 9,9 7,9 10,2 11,7 13,4 11,8 7,2 12,7
Jordan 6,2 7,7 7,5 7,6 7,3 7,4 9,2 8,8 9,1 8,0 8,5 12,0 11,9 11,7 9,0 10,1
Lebanon 4,2 4,6 4,8 4,8 4,4 4,6 4,9 5,6 5,4 4,0 4,8 5,0 7,1 6,1 2,8 4,9
Libya 6,4 7,2 7,1 7,2 6,9 7,1 8,0 7,3 7,8 7,0 7,9 9,7 8,6 8,9 6,9 9,1
Morocco 31,9 35,6 35,0 35,7 35,4 35,5 38,7 37,1 39,0 37,9 38,0 42,7 41,5 44,3 40,5 40,6
O.P.T.  4,0 5,5 5,4 5,5 5,2 5,3 7,2 6,8 7,0 6,2 6,8 10,8 9,9 9,8 8,5 9,8
Syria 20,4 24,8 24,5 24,7 24,4 24,3 29,7 28,4 29,2 28,2 28,2 38,4 35,1 36,4 35,1 34,0
Tunisia 10,5 11,5 11,5 11,5 11,3 11,7 12,3 12,0 12,4 11,7 12,4 13,2 13,0 13,4 11,6 13,2
Turkey 72,8 80,9 80,6 81,1 80,7 81,8 87,7 86,6 88,3 87,0 88,1 96,1 92,5 98,4 95,3 95,6
Total  280,4 323,3 320,6 323,5 319,5 322,8 362,0 353,9 362,8 348,9 356,9 424,5 409,0 425,2 395,8 405,2
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The figures in Annex 2 show how 2010 age structures are expected to change over a 40-year period, 
should one of the four development scenarios unfold. The current age-sex pyramids of SMCs have 
quite different shapes reflecting different stages of demographic transition. The typical 'pyramid'-
shape of several SMCs, with large proportions of the total population in the youngest age-groups,  
imply a large population momentum, notably in Palestine and Egypt. This means that even if future 
fertility rates in the youngest cohorts of women are much lower than they are today, the sheer size of 
these young cohorts will lead to still large numbers of births.   
Working-age population and demographic dividend   
Empirical studies conclude that demographic factors have a strong, statistically significant effect on 
aggregate saving rates and on economic growth (e.g. Bloom and Canning, 2001), notably the share of 
the working age population.   
In the past decades, countries experience substantial changes in their age structures depending on 
whether, when, how and how fast they move through different stages of demographic transition, that is, 
from a regime of high mortality and fertility rates to one with low rates. During the transition  period 
countries undergo a substantial rise in the share of the working age population in the total population. 
This is positive development as it can have a direct, favourable effect on per capita income. Given 
fixed output per worker, labour force participation rates, employment rates, and absence of 
environmental and spatial restrictions to economic growth, a rise in the share of the working-age 
population leads to an increase in output per capita, which can be considered as a first demographic 
dividend. This first demographic dividend may lasts for some decades but it is a temporary 
phenomenon a period of high shares in the working ages will eventually be followed by lower ones 
while shares of elderly in the population will increasing. The same demographic forces producing an 
end to the first dividend may lead to a second demographic dividend arising from savings and assets 
accumulated during the years people worked while costs of raising children were low because they 
had fewer children to raise as fertility rates were lower than in previous generations. The second 
demographic dividend typically follows the first demographic dividend but dependents on the 
propensity to save (e.g. Lee and Mason, 2006; Mason 2005).  
The figures in Annex 3 show for each country and for each scenario how the share of the working-age 
population in the total population is expected to change between 2010 and 2050. Differences between 
countries appear to be large, reflecting differences in when fertility and mortality started declining and 
the speed with which this took place.  
In all countries the integration scenario (S2) is associated with highest levels and increases in 
demographic dividend, while the S3 scenario is frequently second best. This is not a priori evident. It 
turns out that these two scenarios in combination with existing age-sex distributions of SMC 
populations lead to the most favourable timing and duration of fertility declines and life expectancy 
increases during the period 2010-2050 (e.g. see Annex 1). The rapid rise of demographic dividend 
occurs because, numbers populating the bottom of the age-pyramid decrease rapidly, due to the speed 
of decline of fertility. This decline is not attenuated much by growing population numbers in the 
highest age groups (65+) resulting from life expectancy increases at higher ages and from larger birth 
cohorts that gradually start populating these highest age groups.   
 
The figures in Annex 3 show that, as time goes by, demographic dividend, after a period of increase, 
declines again and this is because population decline in the lowest age groups will increasingly be 
compensated by population growth in the oldest age-groups (65+), which is caused by the long term 
effect of rising life expectancies (Annex 1) and of large birth cohorts of the past that start populating 
the oldest age groups (65+). Thus, during the period of the rise of demographic dividend the share of 
the dependent population comprises predominantly of youth below age 15 and less so  of elderly 
(>65+), while during the period of decline of demographic dividend the population composition of the 
dependents shifts towards an increased share of the elderly.  
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The figure also shows that for the majority of countries the peak level of the share of the working age 
population comes close to 70%. Furthermore, it shows that countries differ markedly regarding when  
peak level shares are highest and for how long such high levels prevail. For most countries shares are 
still rising up to about 2035. Palestine, Jordan, and Syria though reach peak-level shares beyond 2050. 
Of the 11 countries, Palestine currently has the lowest working age population share (54.7 %) and the 
highest  growth potential in terms of demographic dividend. Tunisia (69.6% in 2010) and Lebanon 
(70.1% in 2015) though have practically already reached peak-level demographic dividend but levels 
remain high at least up to 2035, after which working age shares will be rapidly decreasing and shares 
of elderly (Table 6) increasing. The figure shows that, compared to Libya and Algeria, Turkey benefits 
relatively longer from high levels of working age shares. The large differences between scenario 
results for Israel reflect the large effect that different international migration assumptions have on the 
size and composition of the population. For instance, the stress scenario (S4) assumes that 
outmigration rises to all-time height figures similar to the all-time high figures of immigration in the 
years following the establishment of Israel in 1948.  
 
Though demographic dividend may be a necessary condition to economic growth it certainly is not a 
sufficient condition. To take full advantage of a situation of around 70% of SMC populations in the 
working ages, SMC governments and market sector enterprises must have set the stage for continuous 
economic growth to absorb growing numbers of people entering the labour market. Thus, employment 
rates
1 should remain stable or, preferably, increase, to ensure that increased numbers people looking 
for work can get it.  
Table 5 shows trends in employment rates in SMC countries and main EU countries (ILO, 2012). 
Employment rates of men in SMCs are high and frequently higher than in EU countries. To a high 
degree this reflects the necessity of men to work and care for the family because women in most of 
these Islamic countries have cultural restrictions to participate in the labour market. This is illustrated 
by the large differences between male and female employment rates in SMCs as compared to the 
differences in EU countries.  
The table also shows that in the past decade employment rates of men in most SMCs have remained 
fairly stable or slightly increased, except for Palestine, Syria and Turkey where rates declined. Apart 
from Syria, female employment rates have remained either stable at low levels or increased. Only in 
the case of Syria rates for women clearly declined even further. The low participation rates of both 
men and women in Palestine are likely to reflect the problematic political and economic conditions. To 
date, Palestinians highly depend on employment opportunities in Israel and Jordan. All scenarios 
foresee rapid Palestinian population growth and rising numbers in the working ages (Figures 3 and 4), 
numbers that are unlikely to be absorbed in local labour markets should the BAU- or stress scenarios 
(S1 and S4) materialize.  
To cope with declining shares of working age populations, for most SMCs beyond 2035, a way out is 
to increase female labour force participation. To date, women in SMCs are a relatively untapped 
source for economic growth so investing in their educational attainment, occupational skills and labour 
force participation is not only wise from an ethical point of view, also from an economic point of view, 
notably in countries where working age shares are decreasing, such as in Tunisia, Lebanon, and 
Turkey.  
 
 
                                                      
1 The employment rate or employment-to-population ratio is defined as the proportion of a country’s working 
age population (e.g. 15-64) gainfully employed. It is one of four indicators to measure progress in Millennium 
Development Goal 1b (achieving full and productive employment and decent work for all, including women and 
young people”. Limitation of the indicator is that it does not weigh job-quality, working conditions, and 
adequacy of  income derived from being employed (ILO, 2012).  POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS FOR SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 2010-2050 | 13 
 
 
Table 5: Trends in employment rates in SMC’s and selected EU countries 
 
 
The elderly 
Last but not least, scenario results indicate that the number of persons in the age group 65+ is expected 
to grow considerably in various countries. The first signs of ageing populations are clearly illustrated 
by the age pyramids of Algeria, Lebanon, Tunisia and Turkey. Another way of looking at this aspect 
of ageing is shown in Table 6 by means of old-age dependency ratios (ODR). ODRs are expressed as 
percentages and relate the number of persons of age 65 and older to the number of persons in the 
working-ages 15-64 years. Such ratios describe the population base for financing the cost of health 
care for the elderly which increase as people grow older. A substantial part of the working age 
population needs to be gainfully employed to provide the financial basis for this health care. However, 
this group is not only a cost-factor to the economy. Accumulated wealth and savings are likely to be 
higher at higher ages. If part of this is invested in the economy, growth in the share of the elderly in 
the population can be interpreted as increase of a second  type of demographic dividend (Mason and 
Lee, 2007; Lee and Mason, 2006; Mason 2005). 
The figures in Table 6 show even more clearly that the 2010 age distributions of all SMCs in 2010 are 
those of relatively young populations compared to populations of EU countries. On average, in the EU, 
there are about four persons in the working age population vs. one person of age 65 or older. In the 
Palestine population (OPT) though there are about 20 persons in the working age range vis. one person 
of age 65 or older. In Israel the situation is quite different from neighbouring Palestine and looks more 
like the situation in the EU. In Israel, there are only about six persons of working age that need to 
support one person of age 65 or older. However, the GDP per capita of Israel is much higher than of 
Palestine. Old-age dependency ratios are on the increase in SMCs, but they lag far behind EU values.  
 
 
 
MF F - M MF F - M MF F - M
Algeria 54 9 -45 62 13 -50 64 15 -49
Egypt 69 18 -51 71 18 -53 70 22 -48
Israel 56 48 -8 56 50 -6 58 54 -4
Jordan 60 12 -48 60 11 -49 59 15 -44
Lebanon 65 19 -46 65 21 -44 65 22 -43
Libya 67 28 -39 70 30 -40 72 30 -42
Morocco 68 26 -42 69 27 -42 68 26 -42
Palestine (O.P.T.) 57 12 -45 49 15 -34 49 16 -33
Syria 75 18 -57 71 14 -57 67 12 -55
Tunesia 61 20 -41 59 22 -37 60 23 -37
Turkey 69 25 -44 64 22 -42 63 26 -38
Sweden 64 57 -7 63 57 -6 63 57 -5
U.K. 66 51 -15 66 52 -13 63 53 -10
France 57 46 -12 58 49 -9 57 49 -7
Germany 63 45 -18 59 46 -13 62 50 -12
Italy 56 31 -25 57 36 -22 55 36 -19
Spain 60 33 -27 63 41 -22 54 43 -11
2005 2010 200014 | GROENEWOLD & DE BEER  
 
 
Table 6. Old-age dependency ratios of SMCs and EU27 (rounded percentages) 
 
 
 
The figures also reflect that the demographic transition from high fertility and mortality rates to low 
ones started relatively late (1980s) compared to countries in Europe and that the speed of the decline is 
different. By 2050 about half the number of SMCs (Egypt, Jordan, OPT, Morocco, Syria, Turkey) will 
still not even come close to the average 2010 old-age dependency ratio of EU27 countries. Only few 
SMCs (Lebanon, Israel) will have dependency ratios by 2050 resembling the  EU27-average of 2030. 
 
Policy implications  
We developed four political-economic development scenarios for SMCs and hypothesized about how 
present values of indicators of demographic behaviour might change should they be shaped in a 
different context. Using conventional population projection methodologies, we derived four scenario 
estimates for each country’s population in terms of future population size and age-sex structures for 
the period 2010-2050. We focussed on analyzing future trends in (1) population growth at regional and 
country levels, (2) growth of working age populations and potential demographic dividend, and (3) 
ageing aspects in view of future cost and benefits of this group. 
Results show that in spite of declines in fertility rates in SMCs, populations are still growing fast and 
far more so than populations of EU countries do. During the 2010-2050 period SMC populations are 
expected to grow considerably, from about 280 million to a figure between 395 and 426 million while 
EU27 populations only grow from about 500 to 525 million people. We found that the margins 
between lowest and highest scenario estimates are not large for predictions of short term population 
growth. For instance, the largest difference in 2020 is between the BAU scenario estimate (323.3 
million) and the stress scenario estimate (319.5 million), which is 3.8 million or about 1% only. This is 
small difference is not surprising because much of the population growth in these countries is already 
embedded in the current size and shape of age-sex pyramids of these countries. A phenomenon called 
‘population momentum’. In the long term though, population estimates become more sensitive to 
differences in scenario assumptions. However, such differences are attenuated because effects of 
specific fertility and mortality scenarios cancel out to some extent. For instance, in the alliance 
scenario (S3) the population-increasing effect of rising life expectancy is partially offset by the 
population-reducing effect of declining fertility. Another issue is that the rather widely different 
scenario assumptions about net numbers of international migrants turned out to have little overall 
2010
S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S3 S4
Algeria 7 11 12 12 11 23 27 28 23
E g y p t 8 1 11 21 21 11 61 92 01 5
Israel 17 21 19 20 23 26 20 24 34
J o r d a n767761 4 1 5 1 7 1 4
L e b a n o n 1 11 51 51 61 62 62 42 93 7
L i b y a 7 1 01 11 11 02 42 72 92 8
Morocco 8 13 14 14 13 21 25 27 20
O . P . T .  5666591 0 1 1 8
S y r i a 7 1 01 01 09 1 51 61 71 4
T u n i s i a1 01 61 61 71 52 83 13 32 8
T u r k e y9 1 41 51 61 42 52 93 02 2
EU27 26
2030 2050
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impact on expected population growth for some countries because net numbers turned out to be small 
relative to total population size, as in the case of Turkey and Egypt. 
We then examined scenario estimates for working age populations. Growth of the working age 
population is considered a demographic dividend because, other things being equal, growing numbers 
of potential workers means increases economic production and earnings. Whether and to what extent 
SMC economies take advantage of demographic dividend depends on the political and economic 
climate in the country, region and world, the presence of creative and effective policy makers and 
planners, and environmental and ecological conditions permitting sustainable economic growth. 
We found that in the coming decades most SMCs will either experience increases in numbers and 
relative size of working age populations, or they experience stabilization of already high numbers and 
shares. Thus, the window-of-opportunity to demographic dividend is opening or already open to   
SMCs. However, to cash-in on demographic dividend only a limited time frame is available as the 
window-of-opportunity starts closing around 2035. Furthermore, the perks of demographic dividend 
may equally turn into demographic penalty if employment opportunities do not adequately increase 
too. Should employment rates remain the same or even decline, such as in the case of Syria and 
Palestine, then numbers of unemployed increase posing a burden to the society, causing social unrest 
and political instability. Labour migration, frequently a safety-valve in the past for excess 
(unemployed) population, will become more difficult because receiving countries, such as EU 
countries, despite expected labour force shortages, increasingly prevent immigrants to enter that do not 
have vocational skills to properly integrate into the labour market and socio-cultural environment of 
receiving countries.  
From a demographic point of view, the Arab Spring could have started 10-15 years ago, leaving more  
time to rebuild and reforming SMC societies. To date, governments are urged to take the lead by 
stepping up efforts to develop and implement effective measures contributing to political stability, 
economic-, employment- and income growth. Such efforts include improvement of availability, 
quality and access to education and vocational skills development (in particular for young women), 
adaptation of human resource development to envisioned labour market requirements, improvement of 
infrastructures, and reduction of government regulations to those contributing to economic growth, 
protection against labour and ecosystem exploitation, and stimulating ethnic and religious tolerance.  
An emerging issue is that ageing becomes a phenomenon to reckon with in some countries (e.g. Israel, 
Tunisia, Lebanon, Turkey) after about 2035. This means that the health system has to be transformed 
to be able to cope with disease pattern changes. This means a shift in focus, from mainly dealing with  
infectious and preventable diseases of children and mothers to typical old-age diseases related to life-
style (overweight, diabetes) and degenerative diseases (cancers). The growing numbers of elderly 
incur increased (health) costs, but these will be significantly reduced if the integration or alliance 
materializes (S2 or S3 scenarios). This is because another type of demographic dividend can be 
expected which is the wealth and savings that the elderly accumulated during the years they 
participated in the labour force. These accumulations will reduce dependency and stimulate the 
economy as savings are generally may be either reinvested or consumed by the elderly.  
If the BAU or stress scenarios unfold the expected economic conditions will be unfavourable in SMCs. 
This may increase emigration pressure among young adults, which may lead to a brain drain of the 
relatively small group of well-educated young adults in SMCs to EU countries. There, highly skilled 
labour and people with ‘desirable skills’ are becoming scarce as most EU countries, in contrast to 
SMCs, face shrinking populations in the working ages. Should the integration or alliance scenarios 
unfold, the future for young adults will be much brighter and may even lead well-educated, pioneering 
children of SMC country emigrants, born in the countries of destination, to return to the home-land of 
their parents to explore possibilities of a future over there. This kind of migration has already been 
observed among enterprising and well-educated children of Turkish emigrants born in Germany who 
explore their options in the currently booming Turkish economy.  
The population and development scenarios were developed at a time when various countries in the 
region are going through a major transition period of fighting for political freedom and 16 | GROENEWOLD & DE BEER  
 
democratisation, and for different government structures. To date, the outcome is yet uncertain. We 
made the assumption that by 2015 the situation would have returned to a more or less stable situation 
in the sense we assume that new political contexts will not lead to major changes in demographic 
behaviour. But is this assumption reasonable if the Arab Spring protests and political mayhem spreads 
over the entire region, leading to the establishment of anti-western, conservative Islamic governments 
in all SMCs? More specifically, can the results of the presented population scenarios encompass a 
population growth trajectory of societies governed by such governments?  
We think the answer is affirmative, and most certainly in the intermediate term, say up to 2030, for the 
following reasons.  
Firstly, the ‘population momentum’ embedded in the current age-sex pyramids of SMCs means that 
population growth during the 2010-2030 period is rather insensitive to sudden changes in fertility and 
mortality rates. Past high fertility rates created large birth cohorts that will reach reproductive age 
about 15-20 years later. Although having fewer births per woman than older generations, the sheer 
size of these birth cohorts means that the absolute number of births is high. Therefore, reinforced by 
declining mortality rates, these will continue to grow for years to come despite the decline in fertility 
rates in the past two decades. With respect to the international migration component of population 
growth, even if all persons who even slightly oppose lifestyles according to conservative Islamic law 
would all intend to emigrate or flee from SMCs, the actual numbers departing would be limited by 
immigration and asylum restrictions in receiving countries. After 2030 the effects of changes in 
fertility and mortality rates would show up but population growth effects would still be attenuated if 
the new political context leads to both higher fertility and mortality rates, because effects would to a 
certain extent cancel out.  
Secondly, the establishment of an anti-western, conservative Islamic government may raise fears about 
a population explosion in these countries. However, there is little evidence that the presence of a 
government inspired by conservative Islamic values, Shiite or Sunni, necessarily leads to higher 
fertility and higher population growth rates. The cases of Iran and Saudi Arabia are illustrative.  
With about 77 million people, the size of Iran is between that of the two largest SMCs, Egypt and 
Turkey. Since 1979, after the ousting of the western-oriented Shah of Persia, Iran has an anti-western 
and conservative Shiite Islamic government, initially under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini. 
Before 1979, Iran was open to western modernisation and life-style influences but the number of 
children (TFR) per woman between 1960 and 1979 hovered between 6.8 and 6.0 children per woman. 
However, after the establishment of the Islamic government in 1979, fertility rates dropped rapidly to 
about 1.9 in 2010, below replacement level fertility (i.e. 2.1 children). Furthermore, the trend in 
declining mortality rates was only interrupted for about 7 years, shortly before and after the 
establishment of the Islamic government. While life expectancy increased from 45 years in 1960 to 
about 55 in 1977, it then dropped to 50 years by 1984. However, after the firm establishment of the 
Islamic government the past trend in life expectancy improvement picked up again leading to a life 
expectancy of 72 years in 2010 (UN, 2012). Saudi Arabia, with its size of 26 million people about the 
size of Morocco and Syria, is the core area of Sunni Muslim tradition. There, too, the average number 
of children per woman fell in past decades, from more than 7 children before 1978 to about 2.8 
children in 2010, while life expectancy increased from about 45 years in 1960 to about 74 years in 
2010 (UN, 2012). Islamic countries are also going through a period of demographic transition, which 
is interrupted temporarily by changes in the socio-political signature of their governments.   
Thirdly, the influence that governments and other macro-level factors have on micro-level 
demographic behaviour of individuals should not be overrated. There are many examples where 
governments have failed to influence the behaviour of individuals, notably if the proposed behaviour 
is not in concordance with aspirations of individuals, couples or social groups. The strict norms and 
values promoted by religious leaders and their followers in governments may in practice only be 
implemented by a minority of the population. For example, despite of the pro-natalist and anti-
abortion stance of the Vatican, Catholic Italians have reduced their number of births rapidly in recent 
decades to a level below replacement. Furthermore, they legalised abortion back in 1978, and abortion POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS FOR SOUTHERN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES, 2010-2050 | 17 
 
rates are still fairly high. Other types of examples can be found in the Sub-Saharan region where 
governments tried, with the financial support and advice of international organisations, mostly in vain, 
to control fertility or safe-sex behaviour by conveying messages to the public about the small family-
norm and safe-sex behaviour. This is because sensitisation of the public through the media (and church 
or mosque) is a necessary but most certainly not a sufficient condition. Other, more pervasive factors 
at the community, household and individual level mean that people decide to behave differently and 
do not necessarily follow the will of governments or the clergy. Factors such as educational attainment, 
wealth status and aspirations, gender norms, values and roles, and perceived costs and benefits of 
rearing children may lead to attitudes and behaviour of individuals that are resilient to change in a 
specific direction. Irrespective of the precise factors and causal mechanisms involved, evidence 
suggests that the impact of religious leaders on reproductive (and other) decisions of couples is limited 
and often overrated, irrespective of the prevailing faith in countries or regions.  
Fourth, more on the political front, it remains to be seen whether conservative Islamic regimes would 
see an advantage in converting the decline in fertility in SMCs in order to boost population growth 
even further and beyond levels currently desired by couples, for instance by giving couples higher 
financial rewards for each additional child and by raising the moral status of high-parity women to 
warriors in a ‘war-of-the-cradles’ with Western nations (cf. Yasir Arafat, see: Steinberg, 1989). Such 
conservative Islamic governments may already have become aware of the present population growth 
momentum built into the age-structures of their populations. Thus, even without launching pro-natalist 
policies, population growth in SMCs will already be (much) higher than in EU countries and most 
other non-Islamic countries. If members of such governments are not yet aware of this, consulting the 
results of the MEDPRO population scenarios in this report might be instructive.  
The above considerations convince us that future population trajectories of SMCs, irrespective of the 
presence of governments with strong or weak religious prescriptions, will develop somewhere 
between the high-low margins of predicted population size as indicated by the population projection 
results of the alliance (S3) and stress (S4) scenarios, respectively (see Table 5).   
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Annex 1. Operationalization of  migration, fertility, mortality assumptions 
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Annex 2. Current (2010) and estimated (2050) population pyramids of 11 SMCs, 
implied by four different development scenarios. 
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Annex 3: Expected demographic dividend: working-age population (15-64) as percentage of the total 
population, by development scenario (S1-S4) 
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